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ABSTRACT
This work provides a systematic analysis of primality testing under
adversarial conditions, where the numbers being tested for primal-
ity are not generated randomly, but instead provided by a possibly
malicious party. Such a situation can arise in secure messaging
protocols where a server supplies Diffie-Hellman parameters to the
peers, or in a secure communications protocol like TLS where a
developer can insert such a number to be able to later passively
spy on client-server data. We study a broad range of cryptographic
libraries and assess their performance in this adversarial setting.
As examples of our findings, we are able to construct 2048-bit com-
posites that are declared prime with probability 1/16 by OpenSSL’s
primality testing in its default configuration; the advertised per-
formance is 2−80. We can also construct 1024-bit composites that
always pass the primality testing routine in GNU GMP when con-
figured with the recommended minimum number of rounds. And,
for a number of libraries (Cryptlib, LibTomCrypt, JavaScript Big
Number, WolfSSL), we can construct composites that always pass
the supplied primality tests. We explore the implications of these
security failures in applications, focusing on the construction of
malicious Diffie-Hellman parameters. We show that, unless careful
primality testing is performed, an adversary can supply parameters
(p,q,д) which on the surface look secure, but where the discrete
logarithm problem in the subgroup of order q generated by д is easy.
We close by making recommendations for users and developers.
In particular, we promote the Baillie-PSW primality test which is
both efficient and conjectured to be robust even in the adversarial
setting for numbers up to a few thousand bits.
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Diffie-Hellman; TLS
ACM Reference Format:
Martin R. Albrecht, Jake Massimo, Kenneth G. Paterson, and Juraj So-
morovsky. 2018. Prime and Prejudice: Primality Testing Under Adversarial
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation
on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the
author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission
and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.
CCS ’18, October 15–19, 2018, Toronto, ON, Canada
© 2018 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM.
ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-5693-0/18/10. . . $15.00
https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243787
Conditions. In CCS ’18: 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer & Com-
munications Security, Oct. 15–19, 2018, Toronto, ON, Canada. ACM, New York,
NY, USA, 18 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243787
1 INTRODUCTION
Many cryptographic primitives rely on prime numbers, with RSA
being the most famous example. However, even in constructions
that do not rely on the difficulty of factoring integers into prime
factors, primality is often relied upon to prevent an adversary from
applying a divide-and-conquer approach (e.g. in the Pohlig-Hellman
algorithm or in a Lim-Lee small subgroup attack [60]) or to prevent
the existence of degenerate cases such as zero divisors (which may
complicate security proofs or reduce output entropy).
One approach to obtaining prime numbers in instantiations of
these cryptographic primitives is to produce such numbers as they
are needed on whatever device requires them. This is accomplished
by sampling random integers and checking for primality. This
process can be computationally intensive to the point of being
prohibitively so. The high cost of producing prime numbers led
implementations to seek ways to reduce this cost and, as demon-
strated in [44], these performance improvements may then lead to
devastating attacks.
If the required prime numbers are public, an alternative approach
is possible: (low-power) devices are provisioned with prime num-
bers from a server or a standard. For example, the popular Telegram
messenger [35] uses Diffie-Hellman (DH) parameters provided by
the server to establish end-to-end encryption between peers. If the
peers do not validate the correctness of the supplied DH parame-
ters,1 the Telegram server can provide malicious DH parameters
with composite group orders and thereby passively obtain the es-
tablished secrets.
Another example is the Transport Layer Security protocol [18]
which can use Diffie-Hellman key exchange to establish master se-
crets in the handshake protocol. The DH parameters are generated
by the TLS server and sent to the client during each TLS hand-
shake.2 It is clear that the TLS server provider does not gain any
advantage by sending malicious DH parameters to the client since
it knows the established master key. However, we can consider an
adversarial developer who implements a malicious sever with back-
doored DH parameter generation, cf. [19, 63]. If such parameters
are accepted by TLS clients and used in the DH key exchange, a
passive adversary can observe the traffic and obtain the master key.
1We stress that they do perform validation in the default implementation.
2Up to version 1.2 (inclusive) of the protocol.
Here, weak DH parameters that still pass tests by trusted tools offer
a sense of plausible deniability. Moreover, if an application simply
silently rejects bad parameters then any countermeasures could be
overcome by repeatedly sending malicious parameter sets having a
reasonable probability of fooling those countermeasures, until the
target client accepts them.
In recent years we have seen several backdoors in cryptographic
implementations. For example, NIST standardised the Dual EC pseu-
dorandom number generator (PRNG) which allows an adversary to
predict generated random values if it can select a generator point
Q and collect enough PRNG output [10]. In 2016 it was shown that
Juniper implemented this PRNG which enabled an adversary to
passively decrypt VPN sessions [9].
A notable example of a potential backdoor involving a composite
number is the security advisory [53] pushed by command-line data
transfer utility socat, which is popular with security professionals
such as penetration testers. There, the DH prime p parameter was
replaced with a new 2048 bit value because “the hard coded 1024
bit DH p parameter was not prime’’. The advisory goes on to state
“since there is no indication of how these parameters were chosen, the
existence of a trapdoor that makes possible for an eavesdropper to
recover the shared secret from a key exchange that uses them cannot
be ruled out”, which highlights a real world application of this attack
model. Similarly, the prime group parameter p given by Group 23
of RFC5114 [32] for use in DH key exchanges has been found to be
partially vulnerable to small subgroup attacks [60]. It might seem
that code reviews and the availability of rigorous primality testing
(in, say, mathematical software packages, cf. Appendix J) impose
high rates of detectability for malicious parameter sets in code or
standards, but as these examples highlight, such sets still occur in
practice.
Given these incidents we can assume a motivated adversary who
is able to implement software serving maliciously generated primes
and/or DH parameters. Thus, there is a need for cryptographic
applications that rely on third-party primes to perform primality
testing. Indeed, many cryptographic libraries incorporate primality
testing facilities and thus it appears this requirement is easy to
satisfy. However, the primary application of these tests is to check
primality (or, more precisely, compositeness) for locally-generated,
random inputs during prime generation. Thus, it is a natural ques-
tion to ask whether these libraries are robust against malicious
inputs, i.e. inputs designed to fool the library into accepting a com-
posite number as prime. We refer to this setting as primality testing
under adversarial conditions.
1.1 Overview of Primality Testing
One of the most widely used primality tests is the Miller-Rabin [41,
51] test. Based upon modular exponentiation by repeated squar-
ing, Miller-Rabin is an efficient polynomial-time algorithm with
complexity O(t log3 n) where t is the number of trials performed.
Yet due to its probabilistic nature, it is well known that a t-trial
Miller-Rabin test is only accurate in declaring a given composite
number to be composite with probability at least 1 − (1/4)t . Arnu-
alt [2], Pomerance [50] and Narayanan [43] all explore methods of
producing Miller-Rabin pseudoprimes, that is, composite numbers
that when tested by Miller-Rabin, achieve the highest probability
of (1/4)t of being wrongly classified as “probably prime”.
Another common choice is the Lucas test [7], and its more strin-
gent variant the strong Lucas probable prime test. Similarly to
the Miller-Rabin test, t trials of a strong Lucas test will declare
a given composite number as being composite with probability
at least 1 − (4/15)t and as being prime with probability at most
(4/15)t [3]. As with the Miller-Rabin test, there are known methods
for constructing strong Lucas pseudoprimes [2].
The Lucas test (strong or standard) can be combined with a single
Miller-Rabin test (on base 2) to form what is known as the Baillie-
PSW test [49]. Due to slightly longer running times, this test is often
only adopted for use in mathematical software packages and seen
less in cryptographic libraries. Unlike the Miller-Rabin and Lucas
tests when performed alone, there are no known pseudoprimes for
the Baillie-PSW test (yet there is no proof that they cannot exist).
Clearly, when conducting a Miller-Rabin or Lucas test, the choice
of the parameter t (the number of trials) is critical. Many crypto-
graphic libraries, for example OpenSSL [48], use test parameters
originating from [14] as popularised in the Handbook of Applied
Cryptography [40]. These give the number of iterations of Miller-
Rabin needed for an error rate less than 2−80, when testing a random
input n. A main result of [14] is that if n is a randomly selected b-bit
odd integer, then t independent rounds of Miller-Rabin testing to
give an error probability:
P(X |Yt ) < b3/22t t−1/242−
√
tb for 3 ≤ t ≤ b/9 and b ≥ 21,
where X denotes the event that n is composite, and Yt the event
that t rounds of Miller-Rabin declares n to be prime. This bound
enables the computation of the minimum value t needed to obtain
P(X |Yt ) ≤ 2−80 for a range of bit-sizes b; see Table 2.
However, these error estimates are for primality testing with
Miller-Rabin on randomly generated n. In the adversarial setting,
we are actually concerned with the probability that t trials of Miller-
Rabin (or some other test) declare a given n to be prime, given that
it is composite. This probability is independent of bit-size, and is at
most (1/4)t if random bases are used in Miller-Rabin tests. Similar
remarks apply for both variants of the Lucas test.
1.2 Contributions & Outline
We investigate the implementation landscape of primality testing in
both cryptographic libraries and mathematical software packages,
and measure the security impact of the widespread failure of imple-
mentations to achieve robust primality testing in the adversarial
setting.
We review primality testing in Section 2. In Section 3, we then
review known techniques for constructing pseudoprimes and ex-
tend them with our target applications in mind. In Section 4, we
then survey primality testing in cryptographic libraries and mathe-
matical software, evaluating their performance in the adversarial
setting. We propose techniques to defeat their tests where we can.
Overall, our finding is that most libraries are not robust in the ad-
versarial setting. Our main results in this direction are summarised
in Table 1.
As one highlight of our results, we find that OpenSSL with its
default primality testing routine will declare certain composites
Table 1: Results of our analysis of cryptographic libraries. This shows how the number of rounds
of Miller-Rabin used is determined, whether a Baillie-PSW test is implemented, the documented
failure rate of the primality test (that is, the probability that it wrongly declares a composite to be
prime), and our highest achieved failure rate for composite input.
Library Rounds of MR testing Baillie-PSW? Documented Our Highest
Failure Rate Failure Rate
OpenSSL 1.1.1-pre6 Default bit-size based No < 2−80 1/16
GNU GMP 6.1.2 User-defined t No (1/4)t 100% for t ≤ 15
GNU Mini-GMP 6.1.2 User-defined t No (1/4)t 100% for t ≤ 101
Java 10 User-defined t Yes (≥ 100 bits) < (1/2)t 0% for ≥ 100 bits
JSBN 1.4 User-defined t No < (1/2)t 100%
Libgcrypt 1.8.2 User-defined t No Not given 1/1024†
Cryptlib 3.4.4 User-defined t ≤ 100 No Not given 100%
LibTomMath 1.0.1 User-defined t ≤ 256 No (1/4)t 100%
LibTomCrypt 1.18.1 User-defined t ≤ 256 No (1/4)t 100%
WolfSSL 3.13.0 User-defined t ≤ 256 No (1/4)t 100%
Bouncy Castle C# 1.8.2 User-defined t No (1/4)t (1/4)t
Botan 2.6.0 User-defined t No ≤ (1/2)t (1/4)t
Crypto++ 7.0 2 or 12 Yes Not given 0%
GoLang 1.10.3 User-defined t Yes < (1/4)t 0%
GoLang pre-1.8 User-defined t No < (1/4)t 100% for t ≤ 13
† When calling the check_prime function as opposed to gcry_prime_check (or calling gcry_prime_check in versions prior to 1.3.0).
n of cryptographic size to be prime with probability 1/16, while
the documented failure rate is 2−80. This arises from OpenSSL’s
reliance on Table 2 to compute the number of rounds of Miller-
Rabin testing required, and this number decreases as the size of
n increases. As another highlight, we construct a 1024-bit com-
posite that is guaranteed to be declared prime by the GNU GMP
library [23] for anything up to and including 15 rounds of testing
(the recommended minimum by GMP). This is as a result of GNU
GMP initialising its PRNG to a static state and consequently using
bases in its Miller-Rabin testing that depend only on n, the num-
ber being tested. We also show how base selection by randomly
sampling from a fixed list of primes, as in Cryptlib, LibTomCrypt,
JavaScript Big Number (JSBN) and WolfSSL, can be subverted: we
construct composites n of cryptographic size that are guaranteed to
be declared prime by these libraries regardless of how many rounds
of testing are performed.
We go on to examine the implications of our findings for appli-
cations, focussing on DH parameter testing. The good news is that
OpenSSL is not impacted because of its insistence on safe primes
for use in DH; that is, it requires DH parameters (p,q,д) for which
q = (p−1)/2 and both p,q are tested for primality. Our current tech-
niques cannot produce malicious parameters in this case. On the
other hand, when more liberal choices of parameter are permitted,
as is the case in Bouncy Castle and Botan, we are able to construct
malicious DH parameter sets which pass the libraries’ testing but
for which the discrete logarithm problem in the subgroup generated
by д is easy.
We close by discussing avenues for improving the robustness of
primality testing in the adversarial setting in Section 6.
1.3 Disclosure and Mitigations
We reported our findings and suggested suitable mitigations based
on the outcome of our analysis to OpenSSL, GMP, JSBN, Cryptlib,
LibTomMath, LibTomCrypt, WolfSSL, Bouncy Castle and Botan.
We give a short review of the outcome of these discussions.
When we reached out to the OpenSSL developers, they were
in the process of amending their primality testing code to make
it FIPS-complaint [47]. However, these changes do not consider
the adversarial scenario on which our paper focuses, and the de-
fault settings in OpenSSL remain weak in that scenario. Thus, it
is left to the user to choose parameters suitable for this scenario.
LibTomMath and LibTomCrypt developers are also in the process
of adjusting the primality testing functions within their library.
They plan to remove the fixed base Miller-Rabin testing and replace
the function with a Baillie-PSW test in accordance with our rec-
ommendations [33]. WolfSSL have made several adaptations in an
upcoming release [26] to their primality testing in response to our
findings. This includes now performing Miller-Rabin with pseudo-
random bases, not overriding the user’s choice of iterations and
increasing the number of rounds performed on prime parameters
in DH and DSA check functions. Bouncy Castle have also made
changes based upon our findings, by removing the DH verification
function and replacing it with a whitelisting approach in upcoming
release 1.8.3. They are also looking into performing Baillie-PSW in
future versions as per our suggestion. Botan version 2.7.0 [37] has
increased the number of rounds of Miller-Rabin performed in DH
verification and includes the addition of the Lucas test to perform
Baillie-PSW as per our suggestions. GNU GMP, Mini-GMP and
Cryptlib all remain unchanged, but the authors of Cryptlib pointed
out a code comment that indicates the limitations of their primality
test. We received no correspondence from JSBN.
2 BACKGROUND ON PRIMALITY TESTING
A primality test is an algorithm used to determine whether or not a
given number is prime. These primality tests come in two different
varieties; deterministic and probabilistic. Deterministic primality
testing algorithms prove conclusively that a number is prime, but
they tend to be slow and are not widely used in practice. A famous
example is the AKS test [1]. We do not discuss such tests further
in this paper, except where they arise in certain mathematical soft-
ware.
Probabilistic primality tests make use of arithmetic conditions
that all primes must satisfy, and test these conditions for the number
n of interest. If the condition does not hold, we learn that n must
be composite. However, if it does hold we may only infer that n is
probably prime, since some composite numbers may also pass the
test. By making repeated tests, the probability that n is composite
conditioned on it having passed some number t of tests can be
made sufficiently small for cryptographic applications. A typical
target probability is 2−80, cf. [40, 4.49]. A critical consideration here
is whether n was generated adversarially or not, since the bounds
that can be inferred on probability may be radically different in the
two cases; more on this below.
We now discuss threewidely-used tests: the Fermat,Miller-Rabin,
and Lucas tests.
2.1 Fermat Test
The Fermat primality test is based upon the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1 (Fermat’s Little Theorem). If p is prime and a is
not divisible by p, then
ap−1 ≡ 1 (mod p).
To test n for primality, one simply chooses a base a and computes
an−1 (mod n). If an−1 . 1 (mod n), then we can be certain that
n is composite. If after testing a variety of bases ai , we find that
that they all satisfy an−1i ≡ 1 (mod n), we may conclude that n is
probably prime.
It is well known that there exists composite numbers that satisfy
an−1 ≡ 1 (mod n) for all integers a that are not divisible by n.
These numbers completely thwart the Fermat test, and are known
as Carmichael numbers. Thesewill be of relevance in the sequel. The
following result is fundamental in the construction of Carmichael
numbers.
Theorem 2.2 (Korselt’s Criterion). A positive composite in-
teger n is a Carmichael number if and only if n is square-free, and
p − 1 | n − 1 for all prime divisors p of n.
2.2 Miller-Rabin Test
The Miller-Rabin [41, 51] primality test is based upon the fact that
there are no non-trivial roots of unity modulo a prime. Let n > 1 be
an odd integer to be tested and write n = 2ed + 1 where d is odd. If
n is prime, then for any integer a with 1 ≤ a < n, we have:
ad ≡ 1 mod n or a2id ≡ −1 mod n for some 0 ≤ i < e .
The Miller-Rabin test then consists of checking the above condi-
tions, declaring a number to be (probably) prime if one of the two
conditions holds, and to be composite if both fail. If one condition
holds, then we say n is a pseudoprime to base a, or that a is a non-
witness to the compositeness of n (since n may be composite, but a
does not demonstrate this fact).
For a composite n, let S(n) denote the number of non-witnesses
a ∈ [1,n−1]. An upper-bound on S(n) is given by results of [42, 51]:
Theorem 2.3 (Monier-Rabin Bound). Let n , 9 be odd and
composite. Then
S(n) ≤ φ(n)4
where φ denotes the Euler totient function.
This bound will be critical in determining the probability that
an adversarially generated n passes the Miller-Rabin test. Since for
large n, we have φ(n) ≈ n, it indicates that no composite n can pass
the Miller-Rabin test for t random bases with probability greater
than (1/4)t . Hence achieving a target probability of 2−80 requires
t ≥ 40. The test is commonly implemented using either (a) a set of
fixed bases (e.g. JSBN) or (b) randomly chosen bases (e.g. OpenSSL).
Of course, the (1/4)t bound only holds in the case of randomly
chosen bases.
2.3 Lucas Test
The Lucas primality test [7] makes use of Lucas sequences, defined
as follows:
Definition 2.4 (Lucas sequence [3]). Let P and Q be integers and
D = P2 − 4Q . Then the Lucas sequences (Uk ) and (Vk ) (with k ≥ 0)
are defined recursively by:
Uk+2 = PUk+1 −QUk where, U0 = 0, U1 = 1,
Vk+2 = PVk+1 −QVk V0 = 2, V1 = P .
The Lucas probable prime test then relies on the following theo-
rem (in which
(
x
p
)
denotes the Legendre symbol, with value 1 if x
is a square modulo p and value -1 otherwise):
Theorem 2.5 ([12]). Let P , Q and D and the Lucas sequences
(Uk ), (Vk ) be defined as above. If p is a prime with gcd(p, 2QD) = 1,
then
U
p−
(
x
p
) ≡ 0 (mod p). (1)
The Lucas probable prime test repeatedly tests property (1) for
different pairs (P,Q). This leads to the notion of a Lucas pseudo-
prime with respect to such a pair.
Definition 2.6 (Lucas pseudoprime). Let n be a composite number
such that gcd(n, 2QD) = 1. IfUn−( xn ) ≡ 0 (mod n), then n is called
a Lucas pseudoprime with respect to parameters (P,Q).
We can now introduce the notion of a strong Lucas probable
prime and strong Lucas pseudoprime with respect to parameters
(P,Q) by the following theorem.
Theorem 2.7 ([3]). Let p be a prime number not dividing 2QD.
Set p −
(
D
p
)
= 2kq with q odd. Then one of the following conditions
is satisfied:
p | Uq or ∃i such that 0 ≤ i < k and p | V2iq . (2)
The strong Lucas probable prime test repeatedly tests prop-
erty (2) for different pairs (P,Q). This leads to the definition of
a strong Lucas pseudoprime with respect to parameters (P,Q) as
follows.
Definition 2.8 (strong Lucas pseudoprime). Let n be a composite
number such that gcd(n, 2QD) = 1. Set n −
(
D
n
)
= 2kq with q odd.
Suppose that:
n | Uq or ∃i such that 0 ≤ i < k and n | V2iq .
Then n is called a strong Lucas pseudoprime with respect to parame-
ters (P,Q).
A strong Lucas pseudoprime is also a Lucas pseudoprime (for
the same (P,Q) pair), but the converse is not necessarily true. The
strong version of the test is therefore seen as the more stringent
option.
Remark. The Lucas pseudoprime and strong Lucas pseudoprime
tests are also known as a Lucas-Selfridge test and a strong Lucas-
Selfridge test respectively, specifically when used with Selfridge’s pa-
rameters P = 1, Q = −1.
Analogously to the Monier-Rabin theorem for pseudoprimes
for the Miller-Rabin primality test, Arnault [3] showed that for
an integer D and n a composite with gcd(D,n) = 1 and n , 9,
the number of pairs (P,Q) with 0 ≤ P,Q < n, gcd(Q,n) = 1,
P2 − 4Q ≡ D (mod n) such that n is strong Lucas pseudoprime
with respect to (P,Q) is at most 4n/15. There is an exception to this
result for certain forms of twin primes (we omit the details here), but
Arnualt goes on to prove that even these particular forms of twin
prime n have at most n/2 pairs (P,Q) such that n is a strong Lucas
pseudoprime with respect to (P,Q). From this, we can infer that t
applications of the strong Lucas test would declare a composite n
to be probably prime with a probability at most (4/15)t .
2.4 Baillie-PSW
The Baillie-PSW [49] test is a probabilistic primality test formed
by combining a single Miller-Rabin test with base 2 with either
a Lucas or strong Lucas pseudoprime test. The idea of this test is
that the two components are “orthogonal” and so it is very un-
likely that a number n will pass both parts. Indeed, there are no
known composite n that pass the Baille-PSW test. Gilchrist [20]
confirmed that there are no Baillie-PSW pseudoprimes less than 264.
PRIMO [38] is an elliptic curve based primality proving program
that uses the Baillie-PSW test to check all intermediate probable
primes. If any of these values were indeed composite, the final
certification would necessarily have failed. Since this has never
occurred during its use, PRIMO’s author Martin estimates [62] that
there are no Baillie-PSW pseudoprimes with less than about 10000
digits. This empirical evidence suggests that numbers of crypto-
graphic size for use in Diffie-Hellman and RSA are unlikely to be
Baillie-PSW pseudoprimes. However, Pomerance gives a heuristic
argument in [49] that there are in-fact infinitely many Baillie-PSW
pseudoprimes. The construction of a single example is a significant
open problem in number theory.
3 CONSTRUCTING PSEUDOPRIMES
In this section, we review known methods of constructing pseu-
doprimes for the Miller-Rabin and Lucas tests. We also provide
variations on these methods. We will use the results of this section
in the next one, where we study the robustness of cryptographic
libraries for primality testing in the adversarial setting.
3.1 Miller-Rabin Pseudoprimes
The exact number of non-witnesses S(n) for any composite number
n can be computed given the factorisation of n [12]. Generating
composites n that have large numbers of non-witnesses is not so
straightforward. In empirical work, Pomerance et al. [50] showed
that many composite numbers that pass a Miller-Rabin primality
test have the form n = (k + 1)(rk + 1) where r is small and k + 1
is prime. More recently, Höglund [25] and Nicely [45] used the
Miller-Rabin primality test as implemented in GNU GMP to test
randomly generated numbers of this form for various values of r
and for various different sizes of k . Their results support the claims
made by [50].
We now consider existing methods for producing composites
which have many non-witnesses, for two forms of the Miller-Rabin
test: firstly where the bases are chosen randomly and secondly
where a fixed set of bases is used.
3.1.1 Random Bases. For random bases, we are interested in
constructing compositen that have large numbers of non-witnesses,
i.e. for which S(n) is large. Such numbers will pass the Miller-Rabin
test with probability S(n)/n per trial; of course, this probability is
bounded by φ(n)/4n ≈ 1/4 by the Monier-Rabin theorem, but we
are interested in how close to this bound we can get. We rely on
the following:
Theorem 3.1 ([43]). Consider an odd composite integer n withm
distinct prime factors p1, . . . ,pm . Suppose that n = 2e ·d + 1 where d
is odd. Also suppose that n =
∏m
i=1 p
ti
i where each pi can be expressed
as 2ei · di + 1 with each di odd. Then
S(n) =
m∏
i=1
gcd(d,di ) ·
(
2min(ei )·m − 1
2m − 1 + 1
)
. (3)
Note how the bound in this theorem does not depend on the
exponents ti , indicating that square-free numbers will have rela-
tively large S(n). Also note the dependence on the terms gcd(d,di ),
indicating that ensuring that the odd part of each prime factor pi
has a large gcd with the odd part of n is necessary for large n. As
an easy corollary of this theorem, we obtain:
Corollary 3.2 ([43]). Let x be an odd integer such that 2x + 1
and 4x + 1 are both prime. Then n = (2x + 1)(4x + 1) has φ(n) = 8x2
and achieves the Monier-Rabin bound, i.e. it satisfies S(n) = φ(n)/4.
The proof of this corollary follows easily on observing that we
may takem = 2 and d = d1 = d2 = x in the preceding theorem.
Narayanan [43] also showed that if n is a Carmichael number of
the form p1p2p3, where each pi is a distinct prime with pi ≡ 3
(mod 4), then S(n) achieves the Monier-Rabin bound. He also gave
further results showing that these two forms for n are the only
ones achieving the Monier-Rabin bound, with all other n satisfying
S(n) ≤ φ(n)/6.
3.1.2 Fixed Bases. Some implementations of the Miller-Rabin
primality test select bases from a fixed list (often of primes), rather
than choosing them at random. For example, until 2010, the Py-
Crypto 2.1.0 (2009) [34] primality test isPrime() performed 7
rounds of Miller-Rabin using the first 7 primes as bases, while
LibTomMath chooses the first t entries from a hard-coded list of
primes as bases.
Arnault [2] presented a method for producing composite num-
bers n = p1p2 · · ·ph that are guaranteed to be declared prime by
Miller-Rabin for any fixed set of prime bases A = {a1,a2, . . . ,at }.
We give an overview and examples of Arnault’s method in Appen-
dix A.
Since fixed base Miller-Rabin tests are relatively uncommon in
implementations, it might seem that Arnault’s method would not
be very useful. We shall however see that this method is particularly
helpful when an implementation chooses bases randomly from a
large fixed list of possibilities. For example, an implementation
might select prime bases randomly from a list of primes below
1000; since Arnault’s method scales well (we simply need to solve
more congruences simultaneously with the CRT) we can use this
method to produce a composite n such that all primes below 1000
are non-witnesses for n. We shall see applications of this approach
for different libraries in Sections 4.3, 4.5, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10.
3.1.3 Hybrid Technique. The method above produces compos-
ites that are in fact always Carmichael numbers. We know from
Section 3.1.1 that if n is a Carmichael number with 3 distinct prime
factors all congruent to 3 (mod 4), then n has the maximum num-
ber of non-witnesses, φ(n)/4. We can set h = 3 in Arnault’s method
and tweak it slightly to ensure that, as well as producing n with
a specified set A of non-witnesses, it produces an n meeting the
Monier-Rabin bound, so that random base Miller-Rabin tests will
also pass with the maximum probability. The tweak is very simple:
we ensure that 2 ∈ A; this forces p1 ≡ 3 or 5 (mod 8); we then
select p1 ≡ 3 (mod 8) so that p1 ≡ 3 (mod 4). Arnault’s method
sets pi = ki (p1−1)+1where the ki are co-prime to all the elements
of A. Since 2 ∈ A, the ki must all be odd; it is easy to see that this
forces pi ≡ 3 (mod 4) too.
We will give an application of this technique in Section 4.6.
3.1.4 Extension For Composite Fixed Bases. The method of Ar-
nault [2] works (as presented) only for prime bases, and not for
composite bases. Although less common, some implementations use
both prime and composite bases in their Miller-Rabin testing. By set-
ting n ≡ 3 (mod 4), we know that e = 1 when writing n = 2e ·d + 1
for d odd. In this case, the conditions to pass the Miller-Rabin test
simply become a(n−1)/2 ≡ ±1 (mod n). Hence, if n ≡ 3 (mod 4)
is pseudoprime to some set of bases {a1,a2, . . . at }, then n is also
pseudoprime for any baseb arising as a productb = ae11 ·ae22 · · · · ·aett(mod n) (for any set of indices ei ∈ Z). Therefore we can construct
a composite n that is pseudoprime with respect to any list of bases
{b1, . . . ,bt } (of which any number can be composite) by using the
hybrid method described in Section 3.1.3, but with set A in that
method being the complete set of prime factors arising in the bi .
Note that in this method, n is of the form n = p1p2p3 where each
pi ≡ 3 (mod 4), so we have n ≡ 3 (mod 4) as needed. Moreover,
because of the form of n, the composites generated in this manner
will also meet the Monier-Rabin bound.
Wewill give an application of this technique in Section 4.3, where
we study Mini-GMP [23] which uses Euler’s polynomial to generate
Miller-Rabin bases.
3.2 Lucas Pseudoprimes
Like Miller-Rabin pseudoprimes, Lucas pseudoprimes are with re-
spect to some choice of test parameters. Throughout this work we
follow Selfridge’s Method A [7] of parameter selection, which is
summarised as follows:
Definition 3.3 (Selfridge’s Method A [7]). LetD be the first element
of the sequence 5,−7, 9,−11, 13, . . . for which
(
D
n
)
= −1. Then set
P = 1 and Q = (1 − D)/4.
There are two reasons for studying this particular method for
setting parameters. The first is that it is the parameter choice used
when performing the Lucas part of the Baillie-PSW primality test [7,
50]. The second is that this is the method that both Java [11] and
Crypto++ [13] libraries that we study use in their implementation
of the Lucas test.
The Lucas and strong Lucas-probable prime tests with this pa-
rameter choice are commonly referred to in the literature as Lucas
and strong Lucas-Selfridge probable prime tests. Pseudoprimes for
this parameter choice are well-documented. The OEIS sequence
A217120 [5] presents a small list of them, referring to a table of all
Lucas pseudoprimes below 1014 ≈ 247 compiled by Jacobsen [28].
There is an equivalent sequence A217255 [6] for strong Lucas pseu-
doprimes. Any pseudoprime for the strong Lucas probable prime
test with respect to some parameter set (P,Q), is also a pseudoprime
for the Lucas probable prime test.
Arnault [2] also presented a scalable method that takes as input a
set of parameter choices {(P1,Q1,D1), (P2,Q2,D2), . . . , (Pt ,Qt ,Dt )}
and returns a compositen of the formn = p1p2 · · ·ph that is a strong
Lucas pseudoprime to the parameters (Pi ,Qi ,Di ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t .
The method is similar to that for constructing Miller-Rabin pseu-
doprimes for fixed bases, but differs in its details. In particular, the
two construction methods are sufficiently different that it seems
hard to derive a single method producing n that are pseudoprimes
for both the Miller-Rabin and Lucas tests.
3.2.1 A specialisation of Arnault [2] for Selfridge’s Method A.
For Selfridge’s Method A, we know that if we take an n such that(
5
n
)
= −1, then a single test on n with parameter set (P,Q,D) =
(1,−1, 5) will be performed. We next show how to specialise Ar-
nault’s construction [2] so that it will produce composites n that
are guaranteed to be declared prime by a strong Lucas test for this
parameter set.
Following Arnault’s construction, we consider n of the form
n = p1p2p3 where pi = ki (p1 + 1) − 1 for i ∈ {2, 3}, with k2 and k3
odd integers.
We first note that the pi must satisfy certain conditions with
respect to Legendre symbols (see [2, Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2]):(
D
pi
)
=
(
Q
pi
)
= −1 for all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ 3.
With our single parameter set (P,Q,D) = (1,−1, 5), this becomes:(−1
pi
)
=
(
5
pi
)
= −1 for all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. (4)
Now
(−1
pi
)
= −1 ⇔ pi ≡ 3 (mod 4). Since pi = ki (p1 + 1) − 1 for
i ∈ {2, 3}, and the ki are odd, then it is easy to show that if p1 ≡ 3
(mod 4) then it follows that pi ≡ 3 (mod 4) for i = 2, 3 as well.
We also have that
(
5
pi
)
= −1 ⇔ pi ≡ 2 or 3 (mod 5). Therefore
condition (4) is satisfied when p1 ≡ 3 or 7 (mod 20) (by the CRT)
and pi ≡ 2 or 3 (mod 5) for i ≥ 2.
At this point we must choose k2,k3 and add conditions that
ensure the coefficients in [2, Lemma 6.1] are indeed integers. These
conditions are simple:
p1 ≡ k−13 (mod k2) and p1 ≡ k−12 (mod k3).
We choose to fix p1 ≡ 7 (mod 20) and select (k2,k3) = (31, 43).
This produces our final congruence that prime p1 must satisfy:
p1 ≡ 6647 (mod 26660). We now search for a prime p1 that satisfies
this congruence, and such thatp2 andp3 satisfyingpi = ki (p1+1)−1
for i = 2, 3 are also primes with p2 ≡ p3 ≡ 2 or 3 (mod 5).
The smallest solution is the following:
p1 = 486527,p2 = 15082367,p3 = 20920703
This yields a 68-bit n = 153515674455111174527 which indeed does
pass the strong Lucas test using Selfridge’s Method A for parame-
ter selection. Of course, we can take any (p1,p2,p3) satisfying the
above conditions (which are not too onerous to satisfy), and in this
sense the method scales well to numbers n of cryptographically
interesting size. For example, Appendix B shows a 2050-bit example
generated using the above procedure.
This generation technique is also versatile, as we can simply
include additional parameters in our set dependent on which pa-
rameter selection methods a particular test uses. This allows us to
generate composites that are declared prime by a variety of strong
Lucas tests, at the small cost of solving a few more simultaneous
congruences with the CRT.
4 CRYPTOGRAPHIC LIBRARIES AND
MATHEMATICS PACKAGES
Many cryptographic libraries offering implementations of com-
mon cryptographic protocols also provide a toolkit for handling
arbitrary-precision integer arithmetic, including primality testing.
These functions would be used, for example, for testing the primal-
ity of Diffie-Hellman parameters.
This section provides a survey of primality testing in a broad
and representative range of cryptographic libraries (OpenSSL, GNU
GMP andMini-GMP, Java, JavaScript Big Number (JSBN), Libgcrypt,
Cryptlib, LibTomMath, LibTomCrypt, WolfSSL, Bouncy Castle,
Botan, Crypto++ and GoLang). For each library, we first describe
how it implements primality testing. We then tailor a composite
likely to be declared prime by each particular library, and quantify
the probability that our composite passes the library’s primality
test (so that the primality test fails). Our findings are summarised
in Table 1. Throughout, we will refer to the number of rounds of
Miller-Rabin testing as t .
Table 2: The rounds t of Miller-Rabin performed chosen
by OpenSSL when testing b-bit integers with checks =
BN_prime_checks.
b t b t
b ≥ 1300 2 400 > b ≥ 350 8
1300 > b ≥ 850 3 350 > b ≥ 300 9
850 > b ≥ 650 4 300 > b ≥ 250 12
650 > b ≥ 550 5 250 > b ≥ 200 15
550 > b ≥ 450 6 200 > b ≥ 150 18
450 > b ≥ 400 7 150 > b 27
4.1 OpenSSL
OpenSSL is the most widely used open source cryptographic library
and TLS implementation. Throughout, we consider OpenSSL 1.1.1-
pre6 [48], although the components studied are largely stable across
releases and remain similar to that of the early releases (version
0.9.6 of Sept. 2000).
Analysis. The primality tests in OpenSSL reside in the crypto
library, which also houses a wide range of implementations of
cryptographic algorithms. The services provided by the crypto
library are used by the OpenSSL implementations of SSL, TLS and
S/MIME, and have also been used to implement SSH, OpenPGP,
and other cryptographic standards.
The functions called upon to perform primality testing in the
OpenSSL BIGNUM library are BN_is_prime_ex and BN_is_prime-
_fasttest_ex found in bn_prime.c. The bulk of the primality
testing algorithm is done in BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex where
t =checks rounds of Miller-Rabin are performed, each with a ran-
domly chosen base. The checks variable is provided as a parameter
to the primality verification function. The function BN_is_prime_ex
simply calls BN_is_prime_fasttest_exwithout doing any trial di-
visions. The composites n that we produce have factors much larger
than those in the trial divisions that OpenSSL performs. This means
that, for our purposes, the result of calling either function is equiva-
lent. Therefore we will focus only on BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex.
Number of Miller-Rabin rounds. Both primality testing functions
allow the user to determine the rounds of Miller-Rabin performed.
The documentation indicates that if the user sets the value of
checks to the variable BN_prime_checks, then the number ofMiller-
Rabin iterations t is chosen such that the probability of a Miller-
Rabin test declaring a random composite number n as prime is less
than 2−80. The number of rounds performed is then based on the
bit-size b of the number n being tested. The relationship between
these two values is shown in Table 2. The entries here are based on
average case error estimates taken from the Handbook of Applied
Cryptography [40], which in turn references [14].
Base Selection. OpenSSL chooses the Miller-Rabin bases it uses in
a pseudorandom manner, by using OpenSSL’s function BN_rand_-
range()with an optional flag set to PRIVATE. This then calls bnrand
to generate a pseudorandom base a in the range 1 ≤ a < n using a
cryptographically strong pseudorandom number generator with
entropy inputs gathered from the operating system, cf. [55] for
details on OpenSSL’s random number generation.
Pseudoprimes. As mentioned in Section 1, the average case esti-
mates from [14] are designed only to be used on testing numbers
during prime generation. Indeed, OpenSSL correctly applies pri-
mality testing as outlined above in this situation. However, we
found nothing in the documentation to warn about the adversar-
ial setting. Instead it appears to be left up to the user to decide
how many rounds of testing are needed, and if they set checks =
BN_prime_checks then Table 2 would dictate how many rounds
are applied. In this setting, we are able to undermine OpenSSL’s
guarantees by producing composite numbers using the methods
described in Section 3.1.1. That is, we can easily construct numbers
of the form n = (2x + 1)(4x + 1) with x odd and 2x + 1, 4x + 1 prime,
and be sure that n will pass random-base Miller-Rabin tests with
probability roughly 1/4 per test. For example, for n having b = 2048
bits, OpenSSL will apply t = 2 tests, and we have a 1/16 chance of
our composite n deceiving OpenSSL.
4.2 GNU GMP
The GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library [23], GNU GMP or
simply GMP, is a popular open source arbitrary precision integer
library that is widely deployed in mathematical software packages.
We consider the latest version GMP 6.1.2 throughout.
Analysis. GMP provides its own datatype to handle big inte-
gers known as mpz_t. GMP’s primality test is implemented in
mpz_probab_prime_p(mpz_t n, int reps). On inputn, this func-
tion performs some trial divisions, then a fixed-base Fermat test
with base 210 = 2 · 3 · 5 · 7, and finally t = reps rounds of Miller-
Rabin; the latter is implemented in function mpz_millerrabin. The
value of reps is selected by the caller. The documentation gives
assurance that a composite number will be identified as being prime
with a probability of less than (1/4)reps and states that “reasonable
values of reps are between 15 and 50”.
Base Selection. GMP uses a pseudorandom number generator
(PRNG) to choose the base used for each Miller-Rabin test. The
PRNG’s state is initialised in the function mpz_millerrabin by call-
ing gmp_randinit_default(rstate), which uses the Mersenne
Twister algorithm. This initial seed state is then used as a source
of randomness in mpz_urandomm(a, rstate, n) to generate a
uniform random integer base a between 2 and n − 2 inclusive.
While GMP offers to seed PRNGs and to explicitly pass them to
functions requiring access to pseudorandom numbers, this option
is not available for primality testing, i.e. each call to mpz_miller-
rabinwill work with an identical PRNG state. Thus, since the initial
seed state is constant, the resulting sequence of a values chosen
by mpz_urandomm for a fixed n is also constant. Note, though, that
different a may be chosen for different n, since the bases a are
sampled uniformly in a range depending on n. This, in effect, means
that the bases chosen when testing n are defined as a function of
n. Therefore the result of mpz_probab_prime_p(mpz_t n, int
reps) for fixed values of n and t is deterministic.3
Pseudoprimes. For integers n, t , let (a1,a2, . . . ,at ) denote the
deterministic list of bases used by GMP, where t = reps. By setting
3We note that the same sequence of ai may still be produced even for different n
when n is only slightly smaller than a power of two. This is due to the application of
rejection sampling by comparison with n to sample in a range up to n.
n = (2x+1)(4x+1)with x odd and 2x+1, 4x+1 both prime, we will
obtain a number for which random base MR tests will pass with
probability roughly 1/4. Since (a1,a2, . . . ,at ) is pseudorandom, we
may expect that an n constructed in this way would pass the MR
tests in GMP with probability (1/4)t . Thus, for example, for the
minimum recommended value of t = 15, it might be feasible to
construct a suitable n which would always be declared prime by
just trying sufficiently many random values of x .
However, recall that we need 2x + 1 and 4x + 1 to be simultane-
ously prime, and we must also pass the base 210 Fermat test. This
makes the cost of constructing n prohibitively high with this direct
approach, since the probability that random x will give prime pairs
(2x + 1, 4x + 1) is approximately (2/lnx)2, and the special form of n
means that a Fermat test will pass with probability roughly 1/2 (see
Appendix C), while passing t rounds of MR testing will happen with
probability only (1/4)t . Putting this together, each x would pass
with probability about 1/22t−1(lnx)2; for a 99% chance of success
in finding a good x with lnx = s , we would need about 5 · 22t−1s2
trials, each trial involving at least a primality test on 2x + 1. For a
1024-bit n and t = 15 trials (the minimum recommended by GMP),
roughly 247 trials would be needed, each involving at least a 512-bit
primality test.
Instead, and partly inspired by the ROCA attack [44], we consider
x of the special form x = kM + 189 whereM is a product of the first
ℓ primes from in the set P = {2, 3, . . . , 373} and k is a randomly
chosen integer of a size to make n = (2x + 1)(4x + 1) have a desired
target size (say, 1024 bits). The selection of x of this form ensures
that 2x + 1 = 2kM + 379 and 4x + 1 = 4kM + 757 are not divisible by
the first ℓ primes in P, boosting the chances that 2x + 1 and 4x + 1
are both prime (the form of x essentially ensures that 2x + 1, 4x + 1
pass trial divisions for the first ℓ primes in P; here we rely on the
fact that 379 and 757 are both prime and larger than 373). The
offset of 189 is specially chosen so that the Fermat test on n to base
210 will always pass for n of the chosen form. This follows from a
bespoke mathematical analysis that is deferred to Appendix C.
Our code for constructing x (and n) of this special form first
picks a target bit-size for n, then selects ℓ as large as possible so
that there are enough choices for k for there to be sufficiently many
candidates that one suitable x will result. For each resulting x , our
code tests 2x + 1 and then 4x + 1 for primality, and (if these tests
pass) applies the GMP primality test for the desired number of t
rounds of MR testing.
For n of 1024 bits, we set ℓ = 69, taking M as the product of
the primes up to 349, and leaving a 51-bit value for k . The choice
of M increases the probability that both of 2x + 1 and 4x + 1 are
prime by a factor of roughly 25, and the form of x ensures that the
Fermat test always passes, giving another factor of 2 improvement.
Using a total of 33,885 core-hours (3.87 core-years) of computation
in parallel on 872 cores running at 2.4GHz, we found the following
1024-bit example passing GMP’s primality test with t = 15 rounds
of MR testing:
n = 2960 · 0x0000000000000000000000000000000081d564fbdd20b406
+ 2768 · 0x750af7bd334dcf547b131a1d8f8235fd603dba44e22e0775
+ 2576 · 0x0ecf755051d33cb8895413f5d69f5a3df701889e3a69f92e
+ 2384 · 0xdd3f5f36662521877231ba4753a3e7185a89ddb0b2d73a35
+ 2192 · 0x9e976a9bcfeae1a7c026d74bc7515a5010f3cd62c69fa9ad
+ 20 · 0x7b699f40e7a85192e1a4aa95537363fcb93d789aee32bbbf.
We recall that this n will always pass GMP’s primality testing
for 15 MR rounds because the generation of the MR bases depends
deterministically on n.
4.3 Mini-GMP
Mini-GMP is a small implementation of a subset of GMP’s mpn
and mpz interfaces included within GMP 6.1.2 [23]. This library
includes its own miniature implementation of mpz_probab_prime-
_p(n, reps). The most significant change compared to GMP is that
Miller-Rabin is performed explicitly with a deterministic sequence
of t bases obtained by evaluating Euler’s polynomial a(x) = x2 +
x + 41 at x = 0, 1, 2, . . . , t − 1. It also omits GMP’s Fermat test.
Pseudoprimes. The use of a sequence of deterministic bases in
Mini-GMP enables us to predict the bases that will be chosen for
any particular value t of reps. The bases are not all prime (though
Euler’s polynomial famously does produce many primes), so we
cannot directly use Arnault’s method from Section 3.1.2. Instead, we
use our extension for composite, fixed bases method in Section 3.1.4.
Using this approach, we constructed a 2960-bit composite n =
p1p2p3 that passes up to t = 101 rounds of Mini-GMP’s Miller-
Rabin testing. Of the 101 bases produced by Euler’s polynomial,
86 were already primes and the remaining 15 bases all factorised
into various combinations of the four primes 163, 167, 179 and 199.
The combined list of 90 unique primes was then used with the
method described in Section 3.1.4 to produce n. This n is given
in Appendix D. We note that the documentation for Mini-GMP is
shared with the main GMP library, implying to a user that 15 to 50
rounds of MR testing would be reasonable.
4.4 Java
Java implementations provide their own methods for arbitrary pre-
cision arithmetic, including primality tests, as seen in java.math.-
BigInteger. We consider OpenJDK10 [11], although there seems
to be no significant changes to this section of the code in older
versions such as JDK8.
Analysis. The primality testing function isProbablePrime is
passed a single parameter certainty. This is a value chosen by
the user and is described in the documentation as: “a measure
of the uncertainty that the caller is willing to tolerate: if the call
returns true the probability that this BigInteger is prime exceeds (1−
1/2certainty).” The certainty parameter is then used to determine
how many rounds of testing will be performed. This is done by
calling the function primeToCertainty. This function first sets a
variable n as (certainty+ 1)/2. This would produce a non-integer
result when certainty is even, yet the result is cast to an integer,
implicitly flooring the result.4
This function also takes into consideration the bit-size of the
number being tested; if it is less than 100, then Miller-Rabin is
performed with at most 50 rounds; if it is greater than 100, then
both Miller-Rabin and a Lucas probable prime test with Selfridge’s
4Because of the role that n plays in determining the number of rounds of Miller-Rabin
to be performed, the result is that there is no difference in testing isProbablePrime(k)
and isProbablePrime(k+1) when k is odd. This has an effect on the assurance given
to the user — the guarantee of 1 − 1/2certainty is no longer accurate for half of the
values of certainty.
parameters are performed, as described in Section 3.2. In the latter
case, the maximum number of rounds of Miller-Rabin is determined
based on the bit-size of the tested number, similarly to OpenSSL.
In both cases, the user’s choice of certainty will determine the
actual number of rounds of Miller-Rabin performed only if it is less
than the internally-specified number for that bit-size.
Pseudoprimes. For numbers of cryptographically interesting size,
Java performs both Miller-Rabin and Lucas probable prime tests. Us-
ing the method outlined in Section 3.2 we could produce composites
that are guaranteed to be declared prime by the Lucas test. However,
the resulting forms do not fit into any of the known families of com-
posites having high numbers of Miller-Rabin non-witnesses. Hence,
we are unable to construct any numbers passing Java’s primality
test with high probability using our current techniques.
4.5 JavaScript Big Number (JSBN)
The Java Script Big Number (JSBN) library written by TomWu [64]
provides a small cryptographic toolkit for Java Script applications.
Here we study the most recent release JSBN 1.4 from 2013. Ac-
cording to its homepage the library has been used in a variety of
applications, including: Forge (a pure JavaScript implementation of
SSL/TLS), Google’s V8 benchmark suite version 6, the JavaScript
Cryptography Toolkit and the RSA-Sign JavaScript library.
Analysis. The library offers the primality test bnIsProbable-
Prime(t) where the parameter t defines the number of rounds of
Miller-Rabin the user wishes to perform. The code documentation
states that this function will “test primality with certainty ≥ 1− .5t ”.
The function pseudorandomly chooses a base a for each round of
Miller-Rabin from a hard-coded list of all primes below 1000 called
lowprimes.
Pseudoprimes. We can consider this implementation as perform-
ing tests with fixed bases, where the bases chosen are all primes be-
tween 2 and 1000. We can then use Arnault’s method (Section 3.1.2)
to construct composite numbers n that pass JSBN’s primality test
no matter how many rounds of testing t the user wishes to per-
form. For example, we used SageMath 7.6 [54] to obtain a 4279-bit
composite n having 3 prime factors, see Appendix E for the details.
4.6 Libgcrypt
Libgcrypt [31] is a general purpose cryptographic library origi-
nally based on code from GnuPG. The library provides various
cryptographic functions, including public key algorithms, large in-
teger functions and primality testing. We analyse the current stable
version 1.8.2, released in December 2017
Analysis. The documentation for Libgcrypt states that the func-
tion used for checking the primality of primes is gcry_prime_check
which is found in primegen.c. This function then calls check_prime
in which the actual testing performed. This function check_prime
performs three testing steps. The first step is trial division with all
primes up to 4999. The second step is a Fermat test with base a = 2.
The last step comprises t rounds of Miller-Rabin where the bases
are pseudorandomly chosen. We note that t is user defined, but
cannot be set to less than 5. The default for checking the numbers
produced in the prime generation algorithm is set to 5, but when a
user calls gcry_prime_check the choice of t is hard-coded to 64.
Pseudoprimes. Following Section 3.1, beating steps 1 and 2 of
the testing performed in check_prime is trivial if we choose n as
a Carmichael number of the form n = pqr where p,q, r > 4999.
By using the hybrid technique in Section 3.1.3, we can create a
Carmichael number that also has the maximum number of ran-
domly distributed non-witnesses. We then need only to overcome
the t Miller-Rabin tests with pseudorandom bases. This happens
with probability (1/4)t . If the user calls gcry_prime_check then
the probability with which we can fool this test would be only
2−128. Yet performing 64 rounds of Miller-Rabin is quite time con-
suming, and a user may be tempted to bypass gcry_prime_check
and call check_prime with fewer rounds. In this hypothetical situ-
ation, or in versions of Libgcrypt prior to 1.3.0 (2007) [30] (where
gcry_prime_check would call t = 5 rounds by default) the best we
could achieve is passing the test with probability 1/1024 (for t = 5).
4.7 Cryptlib
Cryptlib 3.4.3 [24] is an open source security toolkit library devel-
oped by Peter Gutmann. It provides a variety of services including:
public key algorithms, various cryptographic functions and primal-
ity testing.
Analysis. The primalty test in Cryptlib is the function prime-
Probable found in kg_prime.c and is composed of t rounds of
Miller-Rabin, where the value of t must be between 1 and 100
(inclusive) and is chosen by the user upon calling. The function
then chooses the base for each test incrementally from the start
of a fixed list of primes. This is either a list of the first 54 primes
(2 to 251) or the first 2048 primes (2 to 17863), depending on the
preprocessor directive CONFIG_CONSERVE_MEMORY.
Pseudoprimes. Since t ≤ 100, we will at most only ever test using
the primes between 2 and 541 (the hundredth prime) as bases. We
can therefore generate numbers that are guaranteed to be declared
prime by this test for any valid input t , simply by using Arnault’s
method to generate a composite n that has the first 100 primes as
non-witnesses. Indeed, using the method described in Section 3.1.2
we can produce a 2329-bit composite that is pseudoprime to all
prime bases up to and including 541. See Appendix F for details.
4.8 LibTomMath
LibTomMath v1.0.1 [16] is an open sourcemultiple-precision integer
library with a number theoretic toolkit.
Analysis. LibTomMath includes several methods for primality
testing in the form of trial division, Fermat tests, and Miller-Rabin
tests. The latter two take a single base a and a number n to test as
arguments and return whether or not a is a witness or non-witness.
The main primality test is defined by the function mp_prime_is-
_prime, which takes arguments n (the number to be tested), and
integer t with 1 ≤ t ≤ 256. It then performs some trial divisions (on
a default of the first 256 primes) and then t rounds of Miller-Rabin.
The selection of bases to be used is made similarly as in Cryptlib: it
simply picks incrementally from a list of hard-coded primes (but
this time a list of 256 primes up to 1619 are used).
The documentation of LibTomMath (bn.pdf) discusses the num-
ber of rounds of Miller-Rabin required with the statement: “Gener-
ally to ensure a number is very likely to be prime you have to perform
theMiller-Rabin with at least a half-dozen or so unique bases. ”. This is
complemented with a function mp_prime_rabin_miller_trials
that gives the number of rounds needed to achieve an error rate less
than 2−96 based on the bit-size of the number tested (similar to that
in OpenSSL and [14]) and a comment in the header file tommath.h
above mp_prime_rabin_miller_trials that states the probability
of a false classification is no more than (1/4)t .
Pseudoprimes. Since the bases are chosen deterministically based
on the value of t , we can achieve a failure rate of 100% simply by
using the method of Section 3.1.2 to produce a composite n that
has the first 256 primes as non-witnesses; such an n is guaranteed
to be declared prime by mp_prime_is_prime, for any value of t
(including the t chosen by mp_prime_rabin_miller_trials that
describes an error rate less than 2−96). Appendix G provides a 7023-
bit example of such an n. Much smaller examples can be obtained if
smaller values of t are guaranteed to be used; in particular, we can
easily obtain a 1024-bit example for t ≤ 40 (see also Appendix G).
4.9 LibTomCrypt
LibTomCrypt v1.18.1 [15] is an additional cryptographic toolkit
that shares many resources with LibTomMath.
Analysis. The primality test in LibTomCrypt is called as
isprime(n,t,result). It takes as arguments an n to test and car-
ries out t rounds of Miller-Rabin. The documentation of LibTom-
Crypt advises that each round of Miller-Rabin reduces the probabil-
ity of n being a pseudoprime by a factor of 4, and therefore deduces
that the overall error is at most (1/4)t . LibTomCrypt supports se-
lection from three different big integer libraries at runtime.
If LibTomMath is chosen then isprime will call mp_prime_is-
_prime as described in Section 4.8, passing on parameters n and t . If
TomsFastMath [17] is chosen then isprimewill call fp_isprime_ex,
a function defined in the math library TomsFastMath that performs
equivalent testing as LibTomMath’s mp_prime_is_prime. If GMP is
selected then isprime will call mpz_probab_prime_p as described
in Section 4.2. The value of t used by any of the three choices is
inherited from the original call to isprime, however if t = 0 the
value is overwritten to t = 40.
Pseudoprimes. If either LibTomMath or TomsFastMath are se-
lected, the pseudoprimes described in Section 4.8 (see Appendix G)
will always be declared prime by the primality test. If GMP is
selected we can apply the analysis in Section 4.2 to generate pseu-
doprimes (see Appendix C).
4.10 WolfSSL
WolfSSL 3.13.0 [27] (formerly CyaSSL) is a small SSL/TLS library
targeted for use in embedded systems. WolfSSL provides primality
testing tools based on public domain TomsFastMath 0.10 [17] and
LibTomMath 0.38 [16] functions.
Analysis. The primality test inWolfSSL is the function mp_prime-
_is_prime which takes a number n to be tested and the rounds
of testing t as parameters. This function is directly taken from an
older version of LibTomMath, namely 0.38 [16]. WolfSSL will use
LibTomMath by default, but can optionally be compiled to use Toms-
FastMath 0.10 [17] at runtime. The primality test in LibTomMath
0.38 is unchanged from that analysed in version 1.0.1 in Section 4.8.
When using TomsFastMath, mp_prime_is_prime calls fp_isprime
which strips the user’s choice of t and simply calls fp_isprime_ex
with the hard-coded value of t = 8. The function fp_isprime_ex
then performs trial division (on a default of the first 256 primes) and
then does 8 rounds of Miller-Rabin using the first 8 primes as bases.
It thus acts equivalently to mp_prime_is_prime in LibTomMath,
but with t = 8.
Pseudoprimes. Since the testing in WolfSSL is in effect the same
as that performed in LibTomMath (but using only 8 rounds of Miller-
Rabin when using TomsFastMath), the composite examples given
in Appendix G are also declared prime with 100% success.
4.11 Bouncy Castle
Bouncy Castle is a cryptographic library written in Java and C# [46].
The primality test in Bouncy Castle Java is based on the BigInteger
class from JDK as described in Section 4.4. Bouncy Castle C# imple-
ments its own primality tests. We analyse Bouncy Castle C# version
1.8.2.
Analysis. The relevant function responsible for primality tests
is located in the class BigInteger. This class provides method
IsProbablePrime which accepts certainty as a parameter. The
method then uses Miller-Rabin tests with t rounds, where t is com-
puted as t = ((certainty − 1)/2) + 1. In each round the base is
selected using a secure random number generator (SecureRandom)
which is provided by the Bouncy Castle library.
The certainty parameter must always be provided to invoca-
tion of the IsProbablePrimemethod. Therefore, a user choice com-
pletely determines how many Miller-Rabin rounds are performed.
For example, this method is directly used in the TlsDHUtilities
class, which provides Diffie-Hellman operations for TLS. When val-
idating the incoming DH parameters, the ValidateDHParameters
method invokes isProbablePrime with certainty = 2. This re-
sults in only a single Miller-Rabin test being carried out.
Pseudoprimes. We can produce composites n using any of the
methods in Section 3.1; such n meet the Monier-Rabin bound and
so will pass Bouncy Castle’s primality testing with probability
(1/4)t with t as derived from certainty. Although there is no
formal documentation, a comment above the primality testing code
indicates that the failure rate of this testing function should be
(1/2)certainty, and so the user’s choice of certainty is achieved.
4.12 Botan
Botan is a cryptographic library written in C++11 [36]. In addi-
tion to the crypto functionality it offers a TLS client and server
implementation. We analyse Botan 2.6.0.
Analysis. The relevant primality test implementation can be
found in numthry.cpp, which contains function is_prime. This
function first evaluates whether a tested number is divisible by
small primes up to 65521. It then performs Miller-Rabin primality
tests with randomly chosen bases. The source of randomness and
the number of Miller-Rabin rounds are based on parameters passed
to the is_prime function. The number of rounds is computed based
on parameter prob and t is set as (prob + 2)/2. Botan’s documen-
tation is very clear on the distinction between testing numbers of
random and possibly adversarial origin. To distinguish the source,
the function is_prime contains a boolean flag is_random. If set,
then the code uses [14] to assign t based on the bit-size of the
number being tested, with a target failure rate less than 2−80.
Pseudoprimes. Aswith Bouncy Castle, we can produce composite
n using any of the methods in Section 3.1; such n meet the Monier-
Rabin bound and will pass Botan’s primality test with the highest
probability of (1/4)t where t is from the user’s choice of prob via
t = (prob + 2)/2. In this sense, the test’s guarantees match the
user’s expectations.
4.13 Crypto++
Crypto++ 7.0 is an open source C++ cryptography library originally
written byWei Dai [13]. Crypto++ has a variety of primality testing
algorithms in nbtheory.cpp. These consist of trial division, Fermat,
Miller-Rabin and both strong and standard Lucas probable prime
tests. Crypto++’s primality testing function isprime is performing
both Miller-Rabin and strong Lucas tests. Thus, to fool it, we would
need to find Baillie-PSW pseudoprimes (though the Miller-Rabin
test is a random base test, unlike that performed in Baillie-PSW).
We do not currently know any such pseudoprimes.
4.14 GoLang
The Go programming language (GoLang) 1.10.3 [22] created at
Google in 2009 is an open source project including arbitrary-preci-
sion arithmetic and cryptographic functionality.
Analysis. The relevant primality test implementation can be
found in int.go, which contains function ProbablyPrime(t). The
parameter t defines the number of rounds of Miller-Rabin the user
wishes to perform. The function first performs trial division with
a series of small primes, then t rounds of Miller-Rabin (where
one base is forced to be 2 and all other bases are chosen pseudo-
randomly), and finally a Lucas probable prime test. Therefore the
function is performing a Baillie-PSW test. Before version 1.8, Go’s
ProbablyPrime(t) function applied only the Miller-Rabin tests.
The documentation provided by GoLang makes it clear that the
probability of the function declaring a randomly chosen composite
input to be prime is at most (1/4)t . It also states that “Probably-
Prime(t) is not suitable for judging primes that an adversary may
have crafted to fool the test”.
From an attack perspective it is interesting that the pseudoran-
dom number generator used in this primality test is seeded with
the tested number n. Thus, an attacker can reliably predict the
pseudorandomly generated Miller-Rabin bases.
Pseudoprimes. Since a Baillie-PSW test is being performed, we
know of no composites that are incorrectly declared prime by
GoLang. However, for versions prior to 1.8 released in 2017, we are
able to exploit the insecure nature of the Miller-Rabin base selection
to produce composite numbers that are guaranteed to be declared
prime with respect to a parameter t . Since this is the same method
GNU GMP uses to choose bases for Miller-Rabin, we can use the
method described in Section 4.2 to produce such composites. We
give an example of a composite n that is always declared prime for
t ≤ 13 in Appendix H.
4.15 Mathematics Software Packages
We have also examined primality tests found in popular mathe-
matics software packages and computer algebra systems, namely:
Magma, Maple, SageMath, SymPy and Wolfram Mathematica. We
include these in our analysis since they might be relied upon by de-
velopers whenmanually checking values in standards or code. Some
of the libraries use deterministic tests for proving primality, though
most still rely on probabilistic methods when testing candidates
larger than 64 bits in size. Maple and SymPy have dependencies on
GMP and therefore inherit the same issues with its primality test as
discussed in Section 4.2; however they all also perform Lucas tests
in their latest versions, so this “cross contamination” does not result
in exploitable weaknesses. Full details are provided in Appendix J.
5 APPLICATION TO DIFFIE-HELLMAN
Validating the correctness of Diffie-Hellman (DH) parameters is
a vital step for verifying the integrity of the key exchange. As
mentioned in the introduction, since the DH parameter set (p,q,д),
with д ∈ Zp generating a group of order q, is public, they can
originate from third-party sources such as a server or a standard.
An adept DH parameter validation function should check that p,q
are both prime and that p = kq + 1 for some integer k . It would
also test that the given generator д generates the subgroup of order
q and that any received DH values lie in the correct subgroup. A
common choice is to set k = 2, and thus p is a safe-prime. For p
that are not safe primes, the group order q can be much smaller
than p, offering performance improvements. The security level is
then based upon the bit-size of q, which must still be large enough
to thwart the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm for solving the Discrete
Logarithm Problem (DLP), which for prime q runs in time O(√q).
A common parameter choice is a 160-bit q with a 1024-bit p or a
256-bit q with a 2048-bit p.
More precisely, the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm runs in timeO(√t)
where t is the largest prime factor of q. Thus, an attacker armed
with the ability to fool a primality test can supply a sufficiently
smooth composite q such that p = kq + 1 is still prime. For example,
if q is of the form (2x + 1)(4x + 1) this leads to an attack on DLP
with complexity 240 resp. 264 for the sizes mentioned above.
We stress, though, that none of the constructions for malicious
composites in this work pose a risk to protocols such as Telegram
that insist on k = 2, i.e. which check both q = (p − 1)/2 and p
for compositeness. For example, the construction of Section 3.1.1
would set q = (2x + 1)(4x + 1) and yield p that is always divisible
by 3; moreover q would not be smooth enough for Pohlig-Hellman
to pose a threat for parameters of cryptographically appropriate
size. It is an interesting open question to find a large, sufficiently
smooth composite q passing a primality test with high probability
such that p = 2q + 1 is prime or passes a primality test, too.
We now discuss DH verification functions in various libraries.
For each library, we apply the analysis from Section 4 to check how
robust these libraries are to attack. We note that the other libraries
discussed in Section 4 do not implement a higher-level function for
verification of DH parameters. Of course, this does not prevent an
application from using these libraries to realise its own verification
function. Such an application would inherit the weaknesses and
strengths of the underlying library (when k , 2 is permitted). We
give an example of this scenario for the GMP library below. We
close with a discussion of the important use case of SSL/TLS.
OpenSSL. The file dh_check.c contains the functions DH_check-
_params and DH_check. The former is a lightweight check that just
confirms that p and д are ‘likely enough’ to be valid, by testing
to see if p is odd and 1 < д < p − 1. The latter function is more
thorough and calls BN_is_prime_ex to test the primality of both p
and q = (p − 1)/2. These primality tests are called with checks =
BN_prime_checks, therefore the rounds of Miller-Rabin are deter-
mined by Table 2. This means for example that they will declare
as prime with probability 1/16 composites n of the special form
n = (2x + 1)(4x + 1), for x odd and 2x + 1, 4x + 1 prime, when
n has more than 1300 bits. Since no private data is required, this
testing function’s most likely use-case is checking Diffie-Hellman
parameters that have been generated by someone else (perhaps
from an untrusted server or an unknown origin) and therefore
clearly misuses OpenSSL’s own primality testing functions.
However, since OpenSSL restricts parameter sets (p,q,д) to safe-
primes p, efficient attacks are not feasible. Using our current tech-
niques, we cannot generate a set that will, with high probability,
pass primality testing on both p and q simultaneously and allow
efficient solving of the DLP.
Bouncy Castle. The validation of DH parameters in Validate-
DHParameters extracts p,д from a DH parameter set and then only
checks the primality of p with 1 round of Miller-Rabin. We can
therefore produce composites that are accepted as DH moduli with
probability 1/4. More seriously, q is not given to the check function,
so even with a prime p, the value of д can be chosen so that it has
small order, making Pohlig-Hellman as easy as desired. Even if д
had large prime order, the flexibility in choosing parameters would
allow Lim-Lee small subgroup attacks, as explored in [60].
Botan. The Botan function is_prime is used in the class
DL_Group (located in dl_group.cpp) which is also used for verify-
ing DH parameters. This class contains the verify_group function,
which can be invoked with boolean parameter strong. If strong is
set to true, the is_prime function is invoked with prob=128. This
results in t = 65Miller-Rabin computations. Otherwise, prob=10
and 6 Miller-Rabin computations are performed. This test is per-
formed for both p and q; the code also checks that q |(p−1) but does
not insist on p being a safe prime.
Using the methods described in Section 3.1 we can find a q of
160-bits that passes 6 rounds of MR testing with probability 1/4096
such that q has 2 or 3 prime factors. Then we can construct 1024-
bit prime p as p = kq + 1 by using the flexibility in k , and a д
that generates the subgroup of size q. Since this p is indeed prime
and q |(p − 1), all of Botan’s tests on the parameter set (p,q,д) will
pass with probability 1/4096 if strong is set to false. We can
subsequently use the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm to solve the DLP
in the subgroup generated by д and break DH with about 228 effort.
See Appendix I for an example of such a parameter set.
GNU GMP. The 256-bit integer q = (2x + 1)(4x + 1) with
x = 0x400286bac15132db85b1c936709f369b passes 15 rounds
of GMP’s primality test mpz_is_probab_prime_p; picking k =
21792 + 1254 produce the 2048 bit prime p = kq + 1. The resulting
parameter set (p,q,д) would pass even fully adept DH validation
with certainty if the underlying primality testing was based on
GNU GMP’s code with the minimum recommended number of
rounds of Miller-Rabin.
SSL/TLS. We close by commenting on the situation for DH pa-
rameter testing in SSL/TLS. Here, the server chooses parameters
but only sends (p,д) to the client. There is no requirement that p be
a safe prime. This makes it difficult for clients to validate the DH
parameters (they would need to factor p − 1 and then try different
divisors to determine the order of q) or to perform group mem-
bership tests on received DH values. Consequently most clients
perform only simple sanity checks, e.g. checking that д < {0,±1}.
This makes SSL/TLS vulnerable to a variety of malicious DH param-
eter attacks, cf. [60, 63], and in view of these, exhibiting composite
primes p that fool primality tests would be overkill for the SSL/TLS
standards in their present form. However, our work shows that
even if clients tried to validate DH parameters by factoring p − 1,
finding the order of д and then testing it for primality, they could
still fall foul of malicious DH parameters. And if the SSL/TLS proto-
col were amended so that the server provides full DH parameters,
careful checks would still be needed. Finally we note that only a
small number of fixed, safe prime DH parameter sets are permit-
ted in TLS 1.3. These were recently standardised in RFC 7919 [21],
alleviating these issues for future versions of the protocol.
6 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Our work has explored primality testing in the adversarial setting
and its impact for Diffie-Hellman parameter testing. Our main
finding is that leading libraries are not designed for this setting, and
therefore often vulnerable to accepting as prime composite inputs
that are maliciously chosen, see Table 1.
The need for careful distinction between non-adversarial (or ran-
dom) and adversarial primality testing is of course well understood
in the cryptographic research community. However, this distinction
is not necessarily reflected and implemented in cryptographic li-
braries and their documentation. As such, we can generally classify
the underlying cause of the failure in prime classification accuracy
as non-consideration of the adversarial setting. More explicitly, we
can categorise most failures in terms of how the bases for Miller-
Rabin are chosen, i.e. fixed base, predictable bases, insufficient num-
ber of bases. Mini-GMP, JSBN, Cryptlib, LibTomMath, LibTomCrypt
and WolfSSL all fail due to the selection of bases from a fixed list,
whereas GNUGMP and GoLang pre 1.8 both suffer from predictable
bases. OpenSSL, Libgcrypt, Botan and Bouncy Castle C# all have
options to run as many rounds of Miller-Rabin as the user desires,
but either default to, or call the test (elsewhere in the library) with
too few rounds.
Based on our analysis, we make the following recommendations:
• In the absence of known pseudoprimes, we recommend that
libraries switch to using the Baillie-PSW primality test wher-
ever possible. The negative impact on performance is moderate,
and the positive impact on security is significant. An existing
benchmark for such a trade-off is found in the documentation
of the computer algebra system PARI/GP [59] (on which Sage
bases its primality testing functions). PARI/GP implements both
a Miller-Rabin test with user-defined t and a Baillie-PSW test
and indicate [58] that their Baillie-PSW test is about as fast as
their Miller-Rabin test with t = 3.
• Libraries that wish to continue to use Miller-Rabin only (for
example, to maintain a small codebase) should use pseudorandom
bases, cf. Cryptlib, LibTomCrypt, JavaScript Big Number,WolfSSL.
In particular, the bases should not depend only on n, cf. GNU
GMP.
• We also recommend to default to worst-case bounds when pick-
ing the number of iterations and only assume average-case be-
haviour when explicitly instructed to by the user. This may re-
quire changes to interfaces to primality testing code.
• Designers of new protocols should avoid the pitfalls made in
SSL/TLS, where DH parameter validation is made impractical for
clients. TLS 1.3 does so by fixing and requiring use of a small
collection of parameter sets.
Definitions in the cryptographic literature routinely start with “Let
p be a prime . . . ” whereas our work highlights that many imple-
mentations do not necessarily provide strong guarantees for this
assumption to hold. It is thus an interesting open question which
other seemingly innocuous assumptions concerning domain pa-
rameters in the literature can be undermined in a similar fashion.
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A AN OVERVIEW OF ARNAULT’S METHOD
Arnault’s method generates n of the form n = p1p2 . . .ph where
the pi are distinct odd primes such that n is pseudoprime to a set
of t prime bases {a1,a2, . . . ,at }. By [2, Lemma 3.2] we know that
if gcd(a,n) = 1 and
(
a
pi
)
= −1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ h, then a will be a
Miller-Rabin non-witness with respect to n (this set of conditions is
sufficient but not necessary for a to be a Miller-Rabin non-witness
with respect to n).
Now, by Gauss’s law of quadratic reciprocity, we know that, for
any prime p,
(
a
p
)
can be determined from
(
p
a
)
and the values of a
and p taken modulo 4. This in turn means that, for each a, we can
compute the set Sa of possible non-residues mod 4a of potential
primes p. That is, we can compute the set Sa satisfying(
a
p
)
= −1 ⇐⇒ p mod 4a ∈ Sa .
Arnault’s method selects p1 and then determines the other pi from
equations of the form pi = ki (p1 − 1) + 1 where the ki are values
also chosen as part of the method (with k1 = 1). This is done so as
to ensure that the resulting n = p1p2 . . .ph is a Carmichael number.
But the conditions
(
a
pi
)
= −1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ h imply that, for each
a ∈ A and each 1 ≤ i ≤ h we have ki (p1 − 1) + 1 ∈ Sa . Rewriting
this, we obtain that:
p1 mod 4a ∈
h⋂
i=1
k−1i (Sa + ki − 1), (5)
wherek−1i (Sa+ki−1) denotes the set {k−1i (s+ki−1) mod 4a |s ∈ Sa }.
This gives a set of conditions on the value of p1 modulo 4a for
each a ∈ A; typically a few candidates for p1 mod 4a remain for
each value of a. By selecting one of these candidates za for each
a ∈ A and using the CRT, the conditions can be combined into a
single condition on p1 modulom = lcm(4,a1, . . . ,at ). The ki values
must be selected so that the sets on the right of (5) are non-empty;
typically, they are set to small primes larger than the maximum of
the a ∈ A so that k−1i exists mod 4a for each a.
Arnault’s method then brings into play other restrictions on
p1 mod ki for each i = 2, . . . ,h. These result from the requirement
that n be a Carmichael number. We omit the full details, but, for
example, when h = 3, the additional restrictions can be written as:
p1 = k
−1
3 mod k2 and p1 = k
−1
2 mod k3
Making the ki co-prime to each other and to the a ∈ A ensures that
another application of the CRT can be made to incorporate these
conditions. The end result is a single condition of the form:
p1 = z mod lcm(4,a1, . . . ,at ,k2, . . . ,kh )
where z is a fixed value determined by the choice of the za values
and the additional restrictions.
Finally, the method repeatedly generates candidates for p1 satis-
fying the above constraint and uses the equations pi = ki (p1−1)+1
to determine the other pi . The method is successful for a given p1
if all of the resulting p1, . . . ,ph are prime.
Evidently, the method is complex and not guaranteed to suc-
ceed on every attempt for a given set A. However, it can be it-
erated with different choices of the ki until the sets on the right
of (5) are non-empty; moreover a back-tracking approach can be
used to select the za values to speed-up the entire process of
constructing p1. The density of all-prime solutions (p1, . . . ,ph )
amongst all possible candidates (p1, . . . ,ph ) satisfying p1 = z mod
lcm(4,a1, . . . ,at ,k2, . . . ,kh ) and pi = ki (p1 − 1)+ 1 for i = 2, . . . ,h
can be estimated using standard heuristics concerning the distribu-
tion of primes of size L = lcm(4,a1, . . . ,at ,k2, . . . ,kh ); it is roughly
1/(logh (L) ·∑hi=2 log(ki )).
Notice that, the larger the set A, the larger the modulus L in the
condition determining p1 will be. Thus, if A contains many bases,
then larger pi and hence larger n will tend to result. Moreover,
all-prime solutions will become less dense. As an example, when
analysing the primality test in Maple V.2, Arnault [2] considers
h = 3 so n = p1p2p3 and A = {2, 3, 5, 7, 11} (so t = 5); he works
with k2 = 13 and k3 = 41 and arrives finally at the condition:
p1 = 827443 mod 4924920.
Forp1 = 286472803, this yields a 29-decimal digit composite passing
Maple’s fixed-base Miller-Rabin primality test.
We give a short example of the method described for an n of the
form n = p1p2p3 for which the first 10 primes are Miller-Rabin non-
witnesses. That is, we target A = {2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29}.
We start by generating the set Sa of residues modulo 4a of primes
p such that
(
a
p
)
= −1 for each base a ∈ A. We now set k2 = 41 and
a
⋂h
i=1 k
−1
i (Sa + ki − 1) Modulo
2 {3, 5} 8
3 {7} 12
5 {3, 7, 13, 17} 20
7 {15} 28
11 {21, 23} 44
13 {21, 47} 52
17 {5, 29, 31, 39, 63, 65} 68
19 {33, 37, 39, 47, 69} 76
23 {31, 47, 57, 87, 89} 92
29 {19, 37, 41, 55, 77, 95, 99, 113} 116
Table 3: Values a and the sets
⋂h
i=1 k
−1
i (Sa+ki−1)whenk2 = 41
and k3 = 101.
k3 = 101; these are coprime to all a ∈ A. We find subsets of the Sa
that meet the requirement:
p1 (mod 4a) ∈
h⋂
i=1
k−1i (Sa + ki − 1).
This gives us a set of residues modulo 4a for each a ∈ A that p1
must satisfy. We give an example of this for the first 10 primes in
Table 3.
We then need to make a choice of one residue za per set. This
choice is arbitrary, but we note that not all combinations of choices
will lead to a solution. We give an example of a good set of choices
in Table 3 in bold.
We then have two additional conditions to add, based on our
choice of the ki values. These can be written as:
p1 = k
−1
3 mod k2 and p1 = k
−1
2 mod k3
In our example, we chose k1 = 41 and k2 = 101 which gives us:
p1 ≡ 28 (mod 41) and p1 ≡ 32 (mod 101).
We can then use the Chinese Remainder Theorem to simultaneously
solve for the 10 conditions implied by the bold entries in Table 3
and the two conditions above. In this case, we have the solution:
p1 ≡ 36253030834483 mod 107163998661720.
The prime
p1 = 142445387161415482404826365418175962266689133006163
satisfies this condition, and yields primes
p2 = 5840260873618034778597880982145214452934254453252643
p3 = 14386984103302963722887462907235772188935602433622363
such that the product n = p1p2p3 is a 512-bit number that is a
Miller-Rabin pseudoprime to the bases 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23 and
29.
B A LARGE STRONG LUCAS PSEUDOPRIME
Using our SAGE implementation of the method as described in
Section 3.2.1, we construct an n of the form n = p1p2p3, where
pi = ki (p1 + 1) − 1 with (k2,k3) = (31, 43) and
p1 = 2576 · 0x0000000000000000000000bc508ae6dacc43b138c0e9f22d
+ 2384 · 0xfb99b146bedd0ac93f84e8cfe2780a881fdbad85918a6b75
+ 2192 · 0xbd3af841123bad7438fe08c5433ec8b5fa7b0a1b149876bf
+ 20 · 0x5af73cd9a608317066029e0cff4171ce336ff0b666344757.
Then n = p1p2p3 is a 2050-bit strong Lucas pseudoprime for Self-
ridge’s Method A of parameter selection.
C CONSTRUCTING GMP PSEUDOPRIMES
Recall that we work with candidates x of the form x = kM + 189,
and then consider n = (2x + 1)(4x + 1); we select x so that 2x + 1
and 4x + 1 are both prime, and we select M as a product of the
first ℓ primes from the set P = {2, 3, . . . , 373}. We justify this
construction here.
First, note that 2x+1 = 2kM+379while 4x+1 = 4kM+757, where
both 379 and 757 are prime. Considering 2x + 1 modulo each of the
ℓ prime factors p inM , we see that 2x + 1 = 379 mod p , 0 mod p
becausep < 379; similarly, we obtain 4x+1 = 757 mod p , 0 mod p.
Hence no such p divides either 2x + 1 or 4x + 1, so these numbers
are not divisible by any of the primes in the product M (i.e. the
first ℓ primes). For this reason, with random choices of k and with
x = kM + 189, it follows that 2x + 1 and 4x + 1 are more likely to
be prime than they would be for random choices of x . An analysis
of the effect involves an application of the inclusion-exclusion
principle to determine how many numbers are “sieved out” by the
process. We omit the full analysis here, but note that, for numbers
of cryptographically interesting size and with ℓ = 69 that we use
in the construction of our 1024-bit example for n, the effect is to
increase the probability of primality for each number from 1/lnx
to roughly 5/lnx . Since we have two numbers 2x + 1, 4x + 1 whose
primality behaves largely independently over the choice of x , this
yields a 25-fold improvement in the performance of our approach
over the direct approach of trying random x values.
Next, we consider the Fermat test on n with base a = 210, as-
suming the factors 2x + 1 and 4x + 1 are prime. This test com-
putes the value of an−1 mod n and compares it to 1. Now n − 1 =
(2x + 1)(4x + 1) = 8x2 + 6x = 2x(4x + 3), so we obtain:
an−1 = (a4x+3)2x = 1 mod 2x + 1
and
an−1 = a8x 2+6x = (a2x+1)4x · a2x = 1 · a2x = a2x mod 4x + 1.
Here, we have made repeated use of Fermat’s Little Theorem (which
states that ap−1 = 1 mod p for prime p and a , 0 mod p).
It follows that an−1 = 1 mod n if and only if a is a quadratic
residue modulo 4x + 1. It follows that n passes a Fermat test to base
a for roughly half of the possible bases a (since roughly half of the
values a mod n are quadratic residues mod4x + 1).
Now we use the fact that a = 210 = 2 · 3 · 5 · 7 to write:(
210
4x + 1
)
=
(
2
4x + 1
) (
3
4x + 1
) (
5
4x + 1
) (
7
4x + 1
)
.
SinceM is even, we can write 4x + 1 = 8k(M/2) + 757 = 5 mod 8,
hence ( 24x+1 ) = −1. Also ( 34x+1 ) = ( 4kM+7573 ) = ( 7573 ) = ( 13 ) =
1, where we use Gauss’s Law of Quadratic Reciprocity and 3|M .
Similarly, we obtain ( 54x+1 ) = −1 and ( 74x+1 ) = 1. Combining
everything, we finally get(
210
4x + 1
)
= (−1) · 1 · (−1) · 1 = 1.
We conclude that the Fermat test for n of the given form with base
a = 210 always passes.
D A PSEUDOPRIME FOR MINI-GMP
Using our SAGE implementation of the composite fixed base tech-
nique as described in Section 3.1.4, we construct an n of the form
n = p1p2p3, where pi = ki (p1 − 1)+ 1 with (k2,k3) = (10937, 11257)
and
p1 = 2960 · 0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000002e394
+ 2768 · 0x1a2fe4aa9e66358347f63732494d08635ccc9ae0a3c17764
+ 2576 · 0xa8e266f4d26758ab804a702c235f63b1e109a81fc007f94b
+ 2384 · 0xec5158f231a30b1cbf96a7fc444c09be62f5a809f049cc5d
+ 2192 · 0xe94b84275c38885c9b61a6bdc44111501527722a8ac87ea2
+ 20 · 0xa5d4498caa2d9d07b34001a508fa53063991206268c547d7.
This yields a 2960-bit composite n that is guaranteed to pass
any number up to and including t = 101 rounds of Mini-GMP’s
primality test.
E AN EXAMPLE PSEUDOPRIME FOR JSBN
Using our SAGE implementation of the method as described in
Section 3.1.2 with A containing the first 1000 primes, we construct
a 4279-bit n of the form n = p1p2p3, where pi = ki (p1 − 1) + 1 with
(k2,k3) = (1013, 2053) and
p1 = 21344 · 0x0000000000000000000000000000083dda18eb04a7597ca3
+ 21152 · 0xc6bc877df8a08eec6725fa0832cba270c42adc358bc0cf50
+ 2960 · 0xc82cb10f2733c3fb8875231fc1498a7b14cb675fac1bf3c5
+ 2768 · 0x127a76fc11e5d20e27940c95ceba671fe1c4232250b74cbd
+ 2576 · 0xf8448c90321513324c0681afb4ba003353b1afb0f1e8b91c
+ 2384 · 0x60af672a5a6f4d06dd0070a4bc74e425f3eae90379e57754
+ 2192 · 0x82d26e80e247464a4bb817dfcf7572f89f8b9cacd059b584
+ 20 · 0x0e4389c8af84f6a6ea15a3ea5d62cb994b082731ba4cde73.
This produces an n that is guaranteed to be declared prime by
JSBN’s primality test for any certainty parameter t .
F AN EXAMPLE PSEUDOPRIME FOR
CRYPTLIB
Using our SAGE implementation of the method as described in
Section 3.1.2 with A containing the first 100 primes, we construct a
2315-bit n of the form n = p1p2p3, where pi = ki (p1 − 1) + 1 with
(k2,k3) = (641, 677) and
p1 = 2576 · 0x24a027808260908b96d740bef8355ded63f6edb7f70de9a9
+ 2384 · 0xb99c408f131cef3855b4b0aea6b17a4469ed5a7ec8b2be62
+ 2192 · 0x66c3a9eae83a6769e175cb2598256da977b9e191b9b847a7
+ 20 · 0xe2cf4750d9bc2d64ccd3406f5db662c22c3fc65e3c56eff3.
This n is declared prime for any valid number of rounds t of
testing performed by Cryptlib’s primality test.
G EXAMPLE PSEUDOPRIMES FOR
LIBTOMMATH, LIBTOMCRYPT AND
WOLFSSL
Using our SAGE implementation of the method as described in
Section 3.1.2 with A containing the first 256 primes, we construct a
7023-bit n of the form n = p1p2p3, where pi = ki (p1 − 1) + 1 with
(k2,k3) = (2633, 5881) and
p1 = 22304 · 0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000001e46d6a8
+ 22112 · 0x4d42d684ddb3415e871b661303b1c60f0388dfb9e525f8bc
+ 21920 · 0x51c9de3c9f45627608de2f75dee580d9d4d97cab6fa86dad
+ 21728 · 0x9e6bbfd721f297472480a9bed9508aa884bda9dc56833752
+ 21536 · 0xfac8e89f413a9517d14731277148789987806654a8723593
+ 21344 · 0xa452f960facc9b65f6962cb26131b42650c29c8735083c7e
+ 21152 · 0x6c3a220d77d1cbe7f9628885a7b79465287d4b02ad546007
+ 2960 · 0x1d43306a8813836de5ccd162fbeca4f117552dba01975451
+ 2768 · 0x2f7684e32b0377e76f87b96906f8fa276381db612f76c2c7
+ 2576 · 0xdd97ab4380042c991a4719884377c70065a3614237a41289
+ 2384 · 0x24a1017fbb529443b0ad43c5424753db5b518cee5a1fcd87
+ 2192 · 0xea038ffcad33380db1d89cd4e0b15b480cf0c62e8999924d
+ 20 · 0x0284af806081ea106f35f85a664456166b864650ef034cf3.
This n is declared prime for any valid number of rounds t for the
LibTomMath, LibTomCrypt and WolfSSL libraries.
Also using the method as described in Section 3.1.2 but now with
A containing the first 40 primes, we can construct a 1024-bit n of the
form n = p1p2p3, where pi = ki (p1−1)+1with (k2,k3) = (233, 241)
and
p1 = 2192 · 0x000000000000e17516504450e648b6aedb0c0784e17dda33
+ 20 · 0x63e1956a843076a9e5b6d15a819cf0907a96154d47662d0b.
Thisn is guaranteed to be declared prime by mp_prime_is_prime
with t ≤ 40, and therefore also guaranteed to be declared prime
by mp_prime_is_prime as seen LibTomCrypt 1.18.1 and WolfSSL
3.13.0 for the same values of t .
H AN EXAMPLE PSEUDOPRIME FOR
GOLANG PRE-1.8
Using the method described in Section 4.2, we construct a 1024-bit
composite n that is declared prime by GoLang’s primality test in
versions prior to 1.8 with 100% success for t ≤ 13. We take
n = 2960 · 0x00000000000000000000000000000000ff7d428a8a9f9ffc
+ 2768 · 0x2ea178501115ec855f1154c054f5f67e15967a139a92fe15
+ 2576 · 0xddf2c49b044820ea8c58551b74f81b45b116da4e1f11b926
+ 2384 · 0x93e0cdc58006bc2052eb9b2fc32c71dd041d1907225e2814
+ 2192 · 0xebe18736f626fea57c965b67b296a6461455226b39aba263
+ 20 · 0x3faeb483847a715c6a01d8d0e401a4aaf8f3d22121fd142f.
I AN EXAMPLE OF A MALICIOUS DH
PARAMETER SET FOR BOTAN
Using our SAGE implementation of the method in Section 3.1.3, we
construct a 160-bitq of the formq = q1q2q3, whereqi = ki (q1−1)+1
with (k2,k3) = (61, 101) and q1 = 537242417098003.
This q is declared prime with probability 1/4096 by Botan’s
verify_group function. By setting k = 2864 + 134 in p = kq + 1 we
obtain a prime p, and thus by setting the generator д as:
д = 2960 · 0x0000000000000000000000000000000075ead4f9fa60a06e
+ 2768 · 0x0787a1e0708f5e2055b2899691f7dd73303d5643e57b1636
+ 2576 · 0x66ce328086bd6a0df756175c35549ba7a5ffe517036c0ef1
+ 2384 · 0x44a9542f698255efb66cda28b0b8a5ebebf2c0892f8147d3
+ 2192 · 0x72083822a36098addcd30a1767ccefaae65d1dcd6b45de92
+ 20 · 0x09047326d40b622af6a76218664ba3df13eb0fead02d772a
we obtain a parameter set (p,q,д) such that д generates the sub-
group of order q. The probability that this set is accepted by Botan’s
verify_group function is 1/4096. The DLP in the subgroup gener-
ated by д can be solved using the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm over
each of the 49-bit, 55-bit and 56-bit factors q1,q2 and q3 of q. The
cost is dominated by the largest prime factor, and is approximately
228 operations.
J DETAILS OF MATHEMATICS SOFTWARE
PACKAGES
J.1 Magma
Magma V2.23-9 [8] is a mathematical software package designed
for computations in algebra, number theory, algebraic geometry
and algebraic combinatorics.
Analysis. Magma provides a primality testing function that can
either invoke a primality proving algorithm, or what they call a
probable-primality test, depending on the arguments given when
called. The main function call for primality testing is IsPrime(n:-
Proof). The more rigorous method of primality proving is based on
an implementation of the ECPP (Elliptic Curve Primality Proving)
method [4] is used by default, unless the number tested is greater
than 34 × 1013 or the parameter Proof = False. In this case,
the probable-primality test IsProbablePrime is instead called. By
default, this consists of 20 rounds of Miller-Rabin with random
bases. By setting the optional parameter Bases to some value B,
the number of bases used is B instead of 20.
Pseudoprimes. The pseudoprimes generated in Section 3 attempt
only to overcome probabilistic primality testing and are not de-
signed to overcome primality proving methods such as ECPP.
However, if the parameters are set to invoke the probable-prima-
lity test with default parameters, then composites generated by the
methods in Section 3.1 have a probability of 2−40 of being falsely
declared prime. This probability is correctly alluded to as being
worst-case by the documentation given for this function.
J.2 Maple
Maple 2017 [61] is a computer algebra system developed by Maple-
soft, that provides a general purpose software tool for mathematics,
data analysis, visualisation, and programming.
Analysis. The primality test in Maple is called as isprime(n) on
a candidate n to be tested. Documentation states that “It returns
false if n is shown to be composite within one strong pseudo-primality
test and one Lucas test. It returns true otherwise”. The function be-
gins with some trial division on a series of small primes before
calling gmp_isprime(n). If the result of gmp_isprime(n) is 1 (i.e.
the number is “probably prime”) and the candidate n being tested
is greater than 5 × 109 ≈ 233, then isprime will go on to perform a
Lucas test on n. In all other cases, the Lucas test is omitted.
Althoughwe cannot directly inspect the code of gmp_isprime(n)
(sinceMaple is proprietary software) we are able to reverse-engineer
this function by calling it on our own input n and assessing how it
performs. Maple’s documentation states that it performs a Miller-
Rabin test and uses GMP for this function, yet since there is no
other code indicative of a Miller-Rabin test in gmp_isprime(n), we
deduce that Maple is calling GMP’s function mpz_probab_prime_p-
(n, reps). Since gmp_isprime(n) takes only a single argument,
we inferred that Maple passes a hardcoded value of reps to GMP.
We were able to verify that the value of reps is actually 5. We
did this by using the methods described in Section 4.2 to generate
composite numbers of various bit-sizes that are declared prime
by mpz_probab_prime_p (n, reps) for reps = 1,2,3,4,5. For
composites that can only pass at most reps = 4, Maple’s gmp_ispr-
ime correctly identifies these as composite. But for composites that
pass reps = 5, the function falsely declares them to be prime.
Pseudoprimes. When testing numbers n ≤ 5 × 109, isprime acts
as a deterministic version of the Miller-Rabin test. We have verified
this by calling mpz_probab_prime_p(n,5) for all n ≤ 5 × 109 and
comparing the results to a list of primes below 5×109. The different
sets of bases that GMP chooses for each n are such that there are
no composites below this threshold that are declared prime by
mpz_probab_prime_p with reps > 3. However, any change made
to the (flawed) way GMP currently chooses its bases for testing
could actually make Maple’s isprime function less accurate (and
no longer deterministic) for n ≤ 5 × 109!
To fool Maple’s primality testing for numbers larger than 5×109,
we would need a composite n passing a Lucas test and 5 rounds of
Miller-Rabin testing. We do not currently know any such n.
J.3 SageMath
SageMath 8.2 (or simply Sage) is a free Python-based open source
mathematics software system originally created byWilliam Stein [54]
but now developed by many volunteers. Sage provides a toolkit
of mathematical functions in areas such as algebra, combinatorics,
numerical mathematics, number theory, and calculus.
Analysis. Although there are many methods one could use to
test the primality of a number in Sage, the flagship function is
is_prime(n, proof) found in /src/sage/rings/integer.pyx.
If called with the value of proof set as True (default when starting
Sage), the function will perform use a provable primality test. If
set to False it uses a strong pseudo-primality test and instead calls
is_pseudoprime(n).
The “provable primality test” called when proof = True is
the PARI [59] isprime function. This then uses a combination of
the Baillie-PSW test, Selfridge “p − 1”, and Adleman-Pomerance-
Rumely-Cohen-Lenstra (APRCL). It is indicated in documentation
that this test can be “very slow” when testing a prime that “has
more 1000 digits”.
The “strong pseudo-primality test” called when proof = False
is less accurate, but much quicker, and is therefore a likely choice
when testing large candidates. The candidates are then tested by
PARI’s is_pseudoprime(n), which consists of a Baillie-PSW test.
Pseudoprimes. Since a Baillie-PSW test is being performed, we
know of no composites that are incorrectly declared prime by Sage-
Math for either boolean value of proof.
J.4 SymPy
SymPy [57] is a free, open source and widely used symbolic com-
putation Python library that provides a computer algebra system
like functionality.
Analysis. Prior to release 1.1 in July 2017, SymPy 1.0 conducted
the primality test found in isprime in the same manner. After
some initial trial divisions, if no factor is found, the function would
call upon a deterministic version of the Miller-Rabin test, using
bases described in [29, 39]. For numbers larger than ≈ 253, the test
would call additional rounds of Miller-Rabin. In all releases up to
and including 0.6.6 of 2009, this would simply perform 8 rounds
of Miller-Rabin on the bases {2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19}. In version
0.6.7 [56], this was increased to 46 rounds of Miller-Rabin, using
the first 46 primes as bases. The test then remained fundamentally
unchanged until version 1.1 in 2017.
Pseudoprimes. SymPy 1.0 and all previous versions are vulner-
able to composite numbers n generated by the methods in Sec-
tion 3.1.2. These numbers are trivial to construct when the final
Miller-Rabin test is based on the first 8 primes, but even after the
changes made in 0.6.7, all versions prior to 1.1 would wrongly de-
clare composites generated in this manner to be prime. For example,
using the method of Section 3.1.2, we are able to construct a 1024-bit
n of the form n = p1p2p3 that is pseudoprime to all bases selected
by SymPy in all versions prior to 1.1. Here pi = ki (p1 − 1) + 1 with
(k2,k3) = (241, 257) and
p1 = 2192 · 0x000000000000f8ae31e07964373e4997647e75fa186dd5e7
+ 20 · 0xe42ada869da0b3a333813f8102b1fb5f20623d6543e78a3b.
Since SymPy 1.1 introduced a Baillie-PSW test, we can no longer
generate composites that would be declared prime by SymPy.
J.5 Wolfram Mathematica
Wolfram Mathematica is a computational software package de-
veloped by Wolfram Research that covers scientific, engineering,
mathematical, and computing fields. The current release, Mathe-
matica 11.3 [52], features built-in integration with Wolfram Alpha.
Analysis. Mathematica provides the inbuilt primality test PrimeQ
that is said to perform two Miller-Rabin tests using bases 2 and 3,
combined with a “Lucas pseudoprime” test. Since the source code is
not open source, we are unable to verify the parameters used in the
Lucas test. We note that the documentation references Baillie and
Wagstaff [7], from which Selfridge’s parameters originate. Docu-
mentation of the function also indicates that this procedure is only
known to be correct for n < 1016 and that “it is conceivable that for
larger n it could claim a composite number to be prime”.
Pseudoprimes. Since a Baillie-PSW test is being performed, we
know of no composites that are incorrectly declared prime.
